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Resistance and Identity Politics in an Age of Globalization

By
DEBORAH J. YASHAR

This article questions the widely held view that indigenous movements in Latin America during the last decades of the twentieth century were caused by globalization. The author reviews several bodies of literature and concludes that, although globalization may be a fit descriptor for some of the actions and narratives of indigenous movements, it cannot be understood as a causal determinant. Many indigenous movements emerged long before the neoliberal current started, others coincide with it, and yet others lag significantly. The author proposes an alternative framework that gives primary significance to state–society relations. Contrary to the idea that national states may have lost prominence in the age of globalization I contend the opposite, suggesting also that indigenous movements have emerged where there are (1) challenges to preexisting corporate identities, (2) transcommunity networks to provide the resources for mobilization, and (3) associational spaces to facilitate collective expression.

Keywords: globalization; indigenous movements; transcommunity networks; national states and neoliberalism

On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect and the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN/Zapatistas) took over several towns in the state of Chiapas. Both events captured international attention. The former represented the first step toward an equally celebrated and maligned Trade Agreement for the Americas. The latter was embraced and repressed for trying to deepen Mexican democracy by advancing new kinds of citizenship claims. Much ink has been spilled debating the costs and benefits of both NAFTA and the EZLN. But most analysts would find common ground in arguing that both NAFTA and the EZLN are intimately tied to globalization. While NAFTA represents an effort to institutionalize greater integration of international markets (not including the labor market), the EZLN was initially portrayed as a fundamental challenge and critique of globalization writ large.

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With the EZLN, other recent indigenous movements throughout the Americas have been described as reactions against neoliberalism and globalization. The Zapatistas certainly helped project this image—timing their rebellion to coincide with the beginning of NAFTA and hosting conferences that denounced neoliberalism, including the 1995 intercontinental conference for humanity and against neoliberalism (a conference that was later dubbed the *intergalactic* conference for humanity and against neoliberalism). At this latter conference, thousands of activists and public intellectuals came to Chiapas to make common cause with the Zapatistas and to strategize about ways to challenge the new global era.[1]

[T]his article is a cautionary tale about the scope of globalization arguments.

Throughout the Americas, indigenous movements have emerged and deployed discourses opposing neoliberalism, condemning privatization, the sale of public lands to private interests (oil, logging, cattle, etc.), and the decline in social services. Alison Brysk (2000) has analyzed the ways in which indigenous movements have reacted against and taken advantage of a range of global forces and institutions. Brysk significantly advanced our understanding of strategies, alliances, and framing to demonstrate how indigenous movements successfully allied with international actors and deployed strategies to effect change. In light of this journal volume's focus on globalization, and given my opening remarks, it would be logical to assume that I am going to extend this type of argument, highlighting how globalization has shaped the patterns of identity politics found in the Americas. Nevertheless, I do not plan to embark on that task, which Brysk has already undertaken with great success. Instead, this article is a cautionary tale about the scope of globalization arguments.

I argue that, despite the contemporary cache of globalization arguments among activists and scholars alike, globalization is perhaps better suited to describe contemporary campaigns and frames than to explain the *origins* of movements and

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collective action more broadly. I make this contention with specific reference to the contemporary indigenous movement in the Americas. The rest of this article focuses on four types of globalization narratives. I will end by briefly sketching out an alternative perspective that focuses squarely on changing *state-society* relations (citizenship regimes) and efforts to defend local autonomy. In this sense, identity politics should first be anchored in studies of the *state* rather than taking the global arena as the point of departure.

Globalization and Social Movements[2]

It is commonly asserted that globalization has catalyzed social movement activity, particularly around ethnic identity. The burgeoning globalization literature has underscored significant changes in recent years—a greater interpenetration of economic markets, technological changes that increase the speed and density of global communications, a growth of international organizations and networks, and the emergence of new norms that span borders. The literature as a whole skates between those components.[3] Yet there has been little effort to disentangle how the term has been used; to discuss whether and how the various types of globalization relate to one another; and to analyze systematically the impact, if any, on social movements in various regions. It is therefore not surprising that popular perceptions and some scholarship would marshal globalization arguments to account for indigenous movements. This section takes up four types of arguments and highlights their limited ability to *explain* the emergence of Latin America's indigenous mobilization.[4]

Economic globalization

"Globalization" as a concept was first introduced by a diverse group of scholars to capture fundamental changes in the world economy—the rising mobility of international capital, the reconfiguration of production, and the development of communications and computer technology.[5] Such trends, it is commonly argued, have tightly bound economies together and forecast an era of ever more interdependent socioeconomic orders. While some scholars praise the impact of globalization on macroeconomic growth, others question its effects on state sovereignty, social security, democratic accountability, and the rights and responsibilities of citizens.

Examples of such arguments can be found throughout the social sciences. Sassen, a critic of globalization, argued that it increases the power of international capital at the expense of democracy, citizen accountability, and governance.[6] Loker contended that globalization has undermined the authority of the state in key socioeconomic fields and increased inequality, thereby generating local pockets of resistance.[7] Rodrik, a qualified proponent of globalization, argued that it does not inexorably lead to the breakdown of the welfare state[8] but can generate social tensions that in turn pressure politicians to sidetrack or even undermine globalization policies. Because globalization threatens to disadvantage unskilled workers in advanced industrial countries, many labor unions find reason to mobilize against it. Strikes in France and Germany, in particular, have pointed to organized social opposition to economic globalization at the expense of state protection for workers. Moody has argued that the rise in mass strikes between 1994 and 1997 is in large part a response of the working class to "the pressures of lean production, neo-liberal austerity, and international competition."[9] The less dramatic labor and environmentalist protests in the United States against NAFTA, the World Bank, and other world trade negotiations are also part of this pattern. Discussing an earlier period in Latin American history, Dornbusch and Edwards have noted a similar process by which organized unions in Latin America created the imperative for politicians to implement what they consider ill-advised populist policies of protectionism against free trade and a more global or open economy.[10] In other words, for all of these scholars, globalization can create the very social pressures that undermine it. From this perspective, economic globalization can provoke its own antithetical social movements and protest.

One might hypothesize, therefore, that this new stage of globalization (or at the very least the drive to create more open markets) has catalyzed the rise in indigenous movements in Latin America. With the signing of international trade agreements, the opening of domestic markets, the dismantling of state protection programs, and the like, we might expect a rise in new forms of protest in Latin America.[11] At first blush, some of the emerging indigenous movements would seem to support this argument. Mexico's Zapatistas proclaimed that they were mobilizing, in part, against NAFTA. We also find that indigenous movements in the Amazon have denounced the boom in foreign oil exploration that followed the liberalization of foreign investment, ownership, and patrimony clauses. Indigenous groups have organized impressive marches against foreign oil exploration and even kidnapped foreign oil company workers in Ecuador; they have threatened massive suicide in Colombia. The liberalization of markets has also facilitated the entry of other foreign enterprises, each confronting some form of indigenous protest (i.e., gold miners in Brazil and Venezuela, loggers in Brazil and Bolivia, and cattle grazers in Bolivia).[12]

Globalization therefore is an important part of the story insofar as Latin American states have opened up their economies since the 1980s and 1990s to foreign companies and rescinded restrictive clauses regulating foreign ownership and exploration. In many of these cases, foreign exploration has threatened the territorial integrity and sustainability of areas in which indigenous communities have resided. In this context, we do find indigenous mobilization opposing global pressures.

But this type of globalization argument, on its own, is inadequate for studies of indigenous mobilization for several reasons. First, there is no consensus that the current economic era marks a significant *departure* from earlier periods. Indeed, a series of scholars have argued persuasively that globalization has been an ongoing process and that, in point of fact, the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century exhibited greater degrees of economic interdependence than the current phase.[13] For globalization arguments to hold, we would expect to find indigenous movements responding to each peak or at least wave of globalization. This does not occur. Sustained regional and national indigenous movements emerge in the latter part of the twentieth century, not before. Consequently, we cannot attribute (primary or sole) causality to economic globalization, writ large, which has a much longer historical trajectory than the indigenous movements that have emerged only recently.

Second, even if we limit our analyses to the contemporary wave of economic globalization, a problem of timing remains. While some of Latin America's indigenous movements have formed to struggle against and/or negotiate with international companies that have taken advantage of more open Latin American property and investment regimes, this is not so for all or even most of the region's indigenous movements. Latin America's first indigenous movements emerged *prior* to the contemporary wave of economic globalization in Ecuador and Bolivia. In the Amazon, indigenous movements started to form beginning in the 1960s and in response to the penetration of domestic cattle grazers and development agencies. In the Andes, most movements have their origins in the 1960s and 1970s, again responding to domestic developments rather than international pressures. It is only in the late 1980s and 1990s that campaigns against foreign penetration of native lands began, and in that context some, but not all, indigenous movements emerged. Even in Mexico, where the globalization argument seemed most credible, the timing is off. While the EZLN announced its goals on the day that NAFTA took effect, the movement and its constitutive organizations had a history that preceded NAFTA negotiations for many years.[14]

Latin America's first indigenous movements emerged prior to the contemporary wave of economic globalization in Ecuador and Bolivia.

Moreover, anti-NAFTA movements did not occur in all indigenous communities. This raises questions about the causal role of NAFTA. So too, in Central America (Nicaragua and Guatemala, in particular), globalization resonates little or not at all with the emergence of indigenous mobilization. What this suggests is that globalization is perhaps more helpful as a descriptor of some cases rather than a causal argument to explain the emergence of ethnic and indigenous movements throughout the region.

Third, were economic globalization to provide the master argument for indigenous social movements, one would expect them to emerge similarly throughout the region. But this has not happened. Indigenous movements remain weak in Peru, moderately strong in Guatemala and Mexico, and strong in Bolivia and Ecuador—all of the Latin American countries experienced economic liberalization through the 1980s and 1990s, yet the strength of autochthonous mobilization varies, with Peru as the real outlier.

Finally, the economic globalization argument cannot explain why *ethnic* as opposed to any other identities have become politically salient at this particular juncture. In fact, scholars of economic globalization (who have primarily worked on Europe) had predicted the reaction of *class*-based groups—class-based both because of the economic consequences of globalization for workers and because of the prior existence of labor federations with defined constituencies and entrenched interests. Yet contemporary protest in Latin America is not solely about class. Latin America has witnessed the emasculation of many unions—rural as well as urban—that have lost their capacity to organize workers and peasants as such. Unions' strikes and protests have decreased in number, and unsurprisingly, unions in many countries are in an even weaker bargaining position to negotiate with the state.[15]

Yet while older unions have lost the power to mobilize and shape policy, new forms of identity politics to contest foreign exploitation have emerged. Rather than protesting foreign companies using a language of class, as predicted by some scholars of globalization, in Latin America movements have most forcefully emerged around ethnic identities.[16] Moreover, they have articulated an agenda that includes but is not limited to material demands. They are also calling for recognition of ethnic rights and a reconfiguration of what it means to be a citizen. Globalization arguments (as currently stated) about more open markets cannot explain such phenomena. To address this problem, we need to look at how more open markets reshape rural property relations and rural cleavages in ways that politicize ethnic identities.

In short, economic globalization provides a handle neither on the timing nor the identity claims of indigenous movements. This is so even while it describes many of the campaigns of greatest international renown. It perhaps proves more useful as a description of the target of some protests rather than the primary explanation of why and where indigenous movements have emerged in the region.

Globalization of resources and networks

A second take on globalization has focused on the formation and growth of a global civil society or what Falk labeled globalization from above, Melucci called a planetary society, and Wapner designated as world civic politics.[17] Scholars have been impressed by the rise in international organizations and advocacy networks that support social movements and pressure for policy change. Keck and Sikkink, in particular, have argued that transnational advocacy networks can provide the material and information resources that enable movements to act effectively for change. They have highlighted how social movements confronted with severe political obstacles at home can and do turn to the international arena to lobby for change and try to effect social transformation. Keck and Sikkink called this the "boomerang effect." Brysk, Fox and Brown, and Edelman have also analyzed transnational alliances.[18] The domestically bounded social movements literature might expect that where domestic options are foreclosed, movements will not emerge. Nevertheless, scholars highlight the resourcefulness of actors to take advantage of and create new political opportunities at the international level; they do not see this process as overdetermined but as open to the possibilities of change at home:

> The international system we present is made up not only of states engaged in self-help or even rule-governed behavior, but of dense webs of interaction and interrelations among citizens of different states which both reflect and help sustain shared values, beliefs, and projects. . . . The globalization process we observe is not an inevitable steamroller but a specific set of interactions among purposeful individuals. Although in the aggregate these interactions may seem earthshaking, they can also be dissected and mapped in a way that reveals greater indeterminacy at most points of the process. There is nothing inevitable about this story: it is the composite of thousands of decision which could have been decided otherwise.[19]

There no doubt has been a significant rise in international networks and resources for Latin America's indigenous movements. Alison Brysk, for example, has detailed the various ways in which movements have appealed to international organizations (including the United Nations, solidarity groups, legal centers, and the like) to draft United Nations documents and to pressure for change at home.[20] Certainly, international funding has risen for indigenous organizations (i.e., Oxfam, Ford, etc.) and international solidarity organizations (i.e., the Amazon Coalition, The Legal Defense Fund, Cultural Survival, Rainforest Action, among many others) that promote their causes.[21] And it is impossible to think about the Zapatistas in Chiapas without commenting on their brilliant use of solidarity organizations, global resources, and international forums.

Moreover, indigenous organizations have reached across national borders—first witnessed on a large scale in the years leading up to the Quincentennial in 1992. Significant indigenous forums that have emerged include Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (Coordinating Body for Indigenous Organizations of the Amazonian Basin; COICA) for the Amazon and The South and Meso American Indian Rights Center (SAIIC) for indigenous peoples of the Americas, among others. They represent significant advances at the international level. Their power of mobilization remains weak, however.

The descriptive evidence might seem overwhelmingly to favor an argument about the globalization of networks and resources. Certainly there is a descriptive fit. But how powerful is the causal argument? As prior scholars have noted, here we need further work to analyze the mechanisms by which successful change does and does not occur. As Fox (2002, 2005) noted, we cannot and should not presume that international statements of endorsement translate into support on the ground, nor can we assume that all outside involvement serves to advance social movement causes. Moreover, we need to be careful not to equate contemporary discourse and alliances with movement origins—since discourse and alliances can change over time. Clifford Bob's work (2005) makes abundantly clear, moreover, that the very international networks and discourse that increase international visibility and clout might in turn serve to weaken organizational and ideological ties to local constituencies. In short, these international campaigns are important but not determinative of either movement origins or success.

It would be irresponsible to disregard the role and impact of international organizations (which in some cases has been quite significant), but we cannot assume that they were necessary or sufficient factors. When we look at the range of cases in Latin America, we find that while some notable organizations received funding from Ford and Oxfam in their early years,[22] others emerged with no international funding. Moreover, on-the-ground studies have demonstrated that international intervention can both support and undermine the emergence and endurance of movements. It has not infrequently divided them, particularly where communities confront more than one organization working within the same location or with the same population. Outside funding and intervention can lead to a greater divide between the leaders who travel in international circles and the communities that they claim to represent. In short, the globalization of networks and resources is not unambiguously positive for movement emergence and formation. These arguments are off on the timing and unclear about the conditions under which global resources are beneficial, problematic and/or inconsequential to movement formation and policy change.[23]

Once formed, indigenous movements in Latin America took on multiple forms, in some cases leveraging the international community (reacting against it, mobilizing with it) to act in favor of a much broader set of campaigns. It is this leveraging that has made movements more modular, more visible—sometimes both more successful in their campaigns while more fragile in their organizational structure (Tarrow 2005; Bob 2005). This indeterminate relationship is what needs to be teased out, not by asserting that globalization matters but by analyzing, comparing, and assessing which factors matter most.

Globalization of norms

A third argument has highlighted the globalization of norms.[24] This body of literature focuses on changes in international rules, as evidenced by conventions and declarations by international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Labor Organization (ILO). The argument is made that such norms provide both the parameters for constituting national interests and legislation as well as ideational resources for social movement claim-making.

Soysal (1994), for example, has argued that human rights norms articulated at the transnational level have affected national discourses, movement strategies, and membership rights in Europe. She outlined how European states have historically developed different models of political incorporation that were generally tied to beliefs about national membership and citizenship. In the postwar period, however, these different states have started to extend to migrants the civil and social rights associated with citizenship, even when migrants do not enjoy the political rights of suffrage. So too we find migrants demanding these rights in one form or another. Soysal explained both of these postwar trends (the extension of membership rights and the mobilization for those rights) with reference to a new set of transnational norms about citizenship and personhood.

Finnemore (1996) also emphasized the causal importance of international norms. Drawing on three case studies, she argued that international norms increasingly shape values and constitute state interest and actions. She suggested that emerging international norms in UNESCO, the Red Cross, and the World Bank reshaped state values regarding the importance of state science bureaucracies, the Geneva Convention, and development. She concluded by underscoring three foundational normative elements (bureaucracy, markets, and human equality) that came to organize international social life by the end of the twentieth century (p. 131).

These suggestive arguments compel us to consider the role of international norms and how they might (re)define political interests, values, and actions, both for states and social movements. In the Latin American context of indigenous organizing, this argument might seem quite credible. It could be said that, with the legislation of the ILO's Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, states and indigenous populations have greater agreement about the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. In fact, Latin American states with less than impressive human rights records toward native groups have increasingly signed on to the Convention in recent years.[25] So too, with the wave of democratization that has swept across Latin America, we find a greater support for norms on international human rights. Moreover, indigenous movements do use ILO and human rights discourse in much of their work.

Yet these norm arguments seem strangely isolated from the push and pull of politics, including, power relations, coercion, diplomacy, economic constraints, coalition building, pressure groups, bargaining, and so on. To make this argument stick, we need to demonstrate when, why, and how norms matter. This is a particular challenge in Latin America, where it is difficult to take the global norms arguments at face value. States in that region have rarely implemented international norms at home, even when they support them in international forums. Authoritarian rule and human rights abuses against nationals were widespread in the 1970s and 1980s, just as human rights regulations were presumably accepted in international arenas. A serious chasm grew between public discourse and political practice—human rights, for example, were not even extended to national citizens, never mind persons of other national origins. Perhaps for this reason, efforts by indigenous activists to hook up their demands with a human rights agenda were generally less than successful. Indeed, some indigenous activists found environmental discourses and allies more useful, as Brysk's work highlights.[26] It remains an open question as to whether states will abide by Convention 169. While Bolivia has made some important advances, other states have experienced many more setbacks as they fail to implement what they signed or, as in Guatemala, populations at times reject referenda designed to ratify some of the items therein. Consequently, we are forced to ask: Under what conditions do states abide by international norms? Which norms, if any, have had an impact and to what degree? At present international norms have had nothing more than contingent support in Latin America, and only a partial impact on citizenship within states. This is surely a question of political bargains and pressure rather than a direct adoption of international norms.[27]

Under what conditions do states abide by international norms? Which norms, if any, have had an impact and to what degree?

Second, and related, it is difficult to argue that international norms have changed state values and beliefs (as most boldly asserted by Finnemore [1996, 129]) when Latin American states have demonstrated only a secondary and contingent concern for citizenship rights, universal personhood, and human equality (the international norms highlighted by Soysal [1994] and Finnemore [1996]). In the current wave of democratization, regimes have extended political and civil rights once again, although in a rather uneven fashion. Yet the social rights that T. H. Marshall (1963) and Soysal (1994) discussed have been under attack in contemporary Latin America as governments prioritize fiscal balance over social policy. Countless social policies have been dismantled or severely weakened in the face of the 1980s and 1990s economic crisis in the region. Indeed, the current round of economic globalization (itself a response to the debt crises and the economic crises that ensued) generated, as Rodrik (1997, 1998) suggested earlier, the drive to dismantle social programs. This resulted in a striking reduction in social programs. In other words, contrary to what Soysal has found in Europe (where social rights have been extended to all members), in Latin America economic globalization in the 1990s trumped global norms about social citizenship.

Third, I have found that indigenous movements (as with the migrants to Europe) sometimes do appeal to international discourse and norms (and increasingly so). Yet we need to be careful not to mistake discourse for motives and international audiences for social movement constituencies. On the one hand, international discourse was rarely used or cited at the founding and formation of most indigenous movements. As elaborated below, indigenous movements largely emerged in response to domestic changes, quite independently of international norms about human and indigenous rights. Once founded, indigenous movements have increasingly appealed to international norms as they have reframed their work to capture broader national and international support. In every case we need to be vigilant to avoid using contemporary discourse to explain why movements emerged at a prior moment.

In short, the important use of international norms—be they about human rights, democracy, the environment, or native peoples—followed rather than catalyzed the movements in question. Globalization can and does affect discourse for international consumption but not necessarily domestic practices. Proclamations about international norms by movement leaders do not necessarily resonate with concerns, discourse, and agendas at the local levels—the very level at which we need to explain indigenous movement emergence and mobilization. Internationally directed and derived discourse does not always reflect community beliefs (which are not homogeneous to begin with); nor does it necessarily filter back down to the local level. Temporality and mechanisms must be evaluated before we can assert the causal impact of globalization. This task requires us to focus more squarely on domestic politics and power.

Political globalization

Finally, a fourth possible take on globalization and collective action flows from arguments about the end of the cold war and its impact both on the global balance of power and on left politics.[28] In both versions of this narrative, the collapse of a global and domestic left alternative presumably allows other identity politics to flourish. Huntington argued, for example, that the cold war privileged central identities and conflicts and suppressed or at least dampened others. With the end of the cold war, there has been greater political and economic interaction between and among states. While it was once easy for states to frame other states within the cold war paradigm, this is no longer the case. Fukuyama has argued that the end of the cold war engendered the end of history, but Huntington has argued quite the contrary.[29] Without a defining paradigm to type allies and enemies, but in a context of greater interactions, Huntington argued that civilizational (very loosely defined as primordial ethnic, cultural, religious, and/or national) identities and differences become more salient. "The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore."[30] In his controversial article and then book, Huntington has argued that this greater prominence of civilizational identities will erupt between the West and the non-West as well as among those within the non-West as they compete for more land, more political power, and more economic resources.[31] In short, civilizational conflicts that were latent have become manifest with the end of the cold war. One would presume therefore that movements would emerge along these same lines.

Certainly the cold war and its end have had an impact on social movements and state responses in Latin America. For example, states in that region during the 1970s and 1980s engaged in some of the most widespread and brutal political repression. Fearful of the "communist" threat from within, states perpetrated human rights abuses against people suspected of communist sympathies. The state helped to frame antiauthoritarian or propoor movements as communist conspiracies that had to be contained if not eliminated. Indigenous peoples who mobilized in places like Guatemala and Peru were inevitably seen by state officials as part and parcel of communist movements, even when they were independent organizations. Those two countries, in particular, witnessed the worst of the repression in the countryside as civil wars left communities and families destroyed and scattered. Anonymous activists (indigenous and otherwise) in both countries have highlighted in interviews how difficult it was to organize in the context of war. For regardless of whether they supported Marxist revolutionaries, the state assumed that they did. Their voice was not heard and their actions were met with state repression.[32]

Against this backdrop, it is possible to argue that the end of the cold war provided this greater space for ethnic identities and organizations to emerge. In important ways, the end of the cold war did expand political opportunities, particularly in Guatemala, although much less so in the other cases studied here. Yet this argument overlooks an important fact: movements, where they emerged in Guatemala, began in the mid-1980s, with the process of democratization, not the end of the cold war. Moreover, the framework under consideration does not account for why similar movements emerged prior to the cold war throughout Latin America or why, despite the end of the cold war, they have not emerged in any significant and sustained way in the contemporary Peruvian context.

The assumptions behind civilizational identities are even more problematic. On one hand, it is not clear what a civilization is. It is difficult to assume, as Huntington (1993) did, that these, or any, identities are static and primordial. Huntington used a loose definition that is grafted onto "civilizations" with no clear prior reasoning. For example, he referred to a Latin American civilization, but it is not clear what that means either descriptively or conceptually and why Latin America has been singled out as a single civilization as opposed to many or any. On the other hand, it is not clear why civilizations would necessarily engage in conflict with one another. Why should we assume that global conflict will emerge? And how do we explain conflicts from within—both among those that presumably form part of the civilization and those that challenge it?

Admittedly, Huntington (1993) was not particularly concerned about internal conflicts as much as global ones, but his fixed understanding of primordial identities belies the ways in which self-definitions have been forged and reforged. Just as Arab states did not have a natural affinity for one another, neither did indigenous communities in Latin America easily forge their panethnic image. The identity and organizations of these movements depended on political action. Huntington's thesis cannot easily travel to explain the conditions under which ethnic movements will emerge within and among states to protest current policies and to demand greater inclusion.

An alternative end of cold war argument focuses on the ensuing collapse of the Left. In its most colloquial form, this argument suggests that with the collapse of the Left, there was a new space and imperative for other forms of identity politics. The Left was no longer able to organize with the same conviction and capacity. With this free terrain, new self definitions found greater space for organization and expression, including the emergence of indigenous movements.[33] This argument is not without merit; some Left organizations remade themselves as Indian movements in the 1990s. Nevertheless, most indigenous movements in the region predate the end of the cold war by years, if not decades.

The Importance of States and Citizenship Regimes

Each of the aforementioned globalization approaches is at first blush compelling and aptly describes movements that have gained substantial press, including the EZLN's protest against NAFTA, indigenous protests against international oil exploration, indigenous participation in United Nations working groups and professional conferences, and the passing of the ILO's Convention 169. In other words, there appears to be a descriptive fit between certain aspects of globalization and the campaigns launched by some social movements.

My review has highlighted, nonetheless, that globalization approaches remain blunt instruments to address the regionwide politicization of ethnic cleavages in general and indigenous movements in Latin America in particular. This is so for several reasons. Conceptually, the term remains imprecise. What does it (not) cover? When did it begin? The competing and vague concepts used do not entirely answer this question and, consequently, make it hard to ascertain if and how globalization does or does not matter. For how can one discern the causal mechanisms when the timing and sequencing of globalization are in fact in question? First, in some cases, the movements to be explained emerge prior to the onset of key moments in economic, political, and normative globalization. Second, even if one grants a common and bounded definition, the globalization arguments themselves beg the question as to why such a process catalyzes collective action in some places and not others and why ethnicity (or any political identity) becomes the primary basis for mobilization in some locations and yet not in others. When we pitch our arguments in terms of globalization, without greater attention paid to why, how, and where domestic actors can and do engage in collective action, we lose sight of the variation that exists among cases. For collective action is not universal; it remains an outcome that requires us to explain variation across and within cases. It is this variation that we need to explain and it this variation that becomes a tool for discerning and substantiating arguments about when and where movements emerge and when and where they do so along ethnic lines. Radcliffe (2001) drew similar conclusions: "the transnational engagement of global organizations, states and subjects are not decided *a priori*, and leave room for agency and dynamics processes of change" (p. 20), adding,

> In light of recent research on transnational networks' influence on policy formulation, it is clear that transnationalism matters in politics and development. The mapping out of such transnational networks however relies upon a detailed *empirical* understanding of the actors involved, their means of communication and the power relationships between them. (p. 27)

In short, the globalization literature thus far largely suffers from an ahistorical and often universalizing understanding of where, if, and how this phenomenon matters for identity politics and collective action. So too this literature often suffers from the assumption, rather than demonstration, that the state is of declining relevance in contemporary politics. As a rich literature on social movements has noted, however, contemporary social movements are often fundamental responses to the state.[34]

In short, the globalization literature thus far largely suffers from an ahistorical and often universalizing understanding of where, if, and how this phenomenon matters for identity politics and collective action.

Tarrow cautioned us against drawing overeager conclusions about globalization.[35] Empirically, rather than theoretically speaking, the international arena has not displaced the (nation) state as the target of political change nor has a global civil society displaced domestically rooted social movements. To the contrary, some (but not all) social movements have appealed to the international arena to bolster preexisting *domestic* currents and struggles. For while borders are more porous, states still maintain the final right of arbitration, legislation, and regulation within the territories and over the population that they govern.[36] They have the final power to determine who has access to membership and under what terms. In this sense, states (still) remain the targets of political protest, much as Tilly (1978) observed years back. Tarrow took this one step further by pointing to the *mechanisms* by which transnational, global, and cosmopolitan actors maneuver to effect change. His findings lead us to research the domestic and international interactions rather than to presume their relationship.

My own research has led to a set of alternative arguments about the emergence of ethnic politics in Latin America. When analyzing indigenous movements against the landscape of the twentieth century, I see indigenous movements as fundamentally claiming and demanding a series of *state-based reforms* to reconfigure citizenship; they seek formal *national* recognition, *local* autonomy, legal pluralism, additional land reforms, and bicultural education, among other changes. As a whole, these demands form part of a "postliberal challenge" (Yashar 1999, 2005) since indigenous people demand both respect and incorporation as individual citizens (the liberal promise) and legal recognition as collectively autonomous units (the postliberal challenge). To pursue these goals, indigenous movements have voiced their demands through social movement politics. They have organized unprecedented marches from the Amazon to the Andes (particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador), staged highway disruptions, occupied government buildings, and organized street protests against various political and economic reforms. As of late, they have also turned to electoral politics to introduce their demands into formal politics.[37] While the movements and their claims as a whole are quite varied, the point to emphasize here is that indigenous people are organizing and articulating ethnic-based agendas that contest the definition and terms of *national* citizenship, both insisting on greater inclusion in the national state *and* greater autonomy from it. Such claims are state-centric. It is this contemporary mobilization of indigenous people in response to changing national conditions that calls out for explanation.

To elucidate these new patterns of claim making, I have argued that contemporary indigenous movements in the Americas emerged in the last third of the twentieth century when three factors were at play: (1) a challenge to local autonomy that resulted from *changing citizenship regimes* (first the erosion of a corporatist regime and then its replacement by a neoliberal one),[38] (2) *transcommunity networks*, and (3) *political associational space* (Yashar 1998, 2005). To make this argument, I compared indigenous movements over time and across cases to explain why the erosion of corporatist citizenship regimes provided the *motive* (by threatening to disrupt local property regimes in ways that challenged indigenous autonomy); why transcommunity networks (built by churches, unions, and NGOs) provided the organizational capacity enabling indigenous leaders to mobilize across disparate communities, including those separated by geographic distance and language; and when political associational space provided the opportunity. Only where these three factors were present did indigenous people have not only the motive but also the capacity and opportunity to forge regional and national movements (as in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico). Where these factors did not *all* come together, movement organizing confronted significant obstacles (as in Peru, where the civil war destroyed networks *and* foreclosed political associational space despite the nominal existence of electoral democracy).

By the mid-1990s, significant indigenous movements existed throughout North, Central, and South America, with the strongest organizations in Ecuador and Bolivia. In Ecuador, the most important group is the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE, or Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador). Bolivia has several important groups: the Confederación Sindical

Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB, or Unified Peasant Workers Trade Union Confederation of Bolivia); the Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco, y Amazonía de Bolivia (CIDOB, or Indigenous Confederation of the East, Chaco, and the Amazon); and more recently, the *cocalero*, or coca growers movement headed by now-President Evo Morales. Moreover, there are prominent organizations in Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala. On a regionwide scale, the weakest organizational indigenous movements still exist in Peru—although the gap appears to be closing now that transcommunity networks are being rebuilt and political associational space has been extended.

Whether one buys this argument or some alternative is less the issue of this article than to say that we should not presume that globalization matters without assessing causes and consequences against the cases—paying close attention to concepts, mechanisms, and temporality. In other words, we need to research these questions rather than presume their answers.

Conclusion

This volume addresses the significance of globalization and certainly the changing international environment is something to behold as we witness an ever more integrated world economy, transnational networks, international norms, and global hegemony. Such characteristics push us to think about the ways in which international factors shape collective action in general and indigenous social movements in particular. They compel us to think about the limits on state sovereignty and the ways in which globalization engenders collective action. It is important to acknowledge the ways in which state borders have changed and new actors have emerged. States have modified their restrictions on free markets, reforged international political alliances, confronted new actors that pressure states to reform their relations with citizens, and come up against a new set of (de)legitimating discourses to which they are expected to respond. In short, globalization arguments portray striking developments that are occurring at the expense of state sovereignty over domestic affairs. Those changes affecting state sovereignty have catalyzed both a defensive form of collective action (against economic globalization) and new kinds of claims making that are shaped by and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the international environment (international networks and norms).

Nevertheless, in this article I struck a cautionary note. For once we look comparatively at collective action, it is apparent that the international arena does not simply shape social movements. Nor does globalization help to explain the timing or intensity of movements that emerge, with some prior to the heyday of globalization (Latin America's indigenous movements), others following on the heels of globalization conjunctures (such as the WTO protests), and yet others emerging several years later (as in human rights movements that adopted United Nations language after it was proclaimed). Finally, globalization does not provide a handle on which identities become the salient basis for collective action. To the contrary, a great deal of diversity exists across cases at any given point in time, as illustrated by the resurgence of labor protest in Europe, indigenous protests in the Americas, environmental movements in the West, and fundamentalist movements in the Middle East.

Given these outstanding questions, globalization is no panacea for studies of collective action (Yashar 2002). Even though changes are taking place in the international economy, networks, and norms, one should not be too quick to assume that these descriptive developments have causal significance. For it is neither clear why, when, and where these changes do or do not generate collective action nor which form collective action is likely to take. Globalization's impact on collective action appears to be highly indeterminate. It is the exploration of this indeterminacy that seems so vital—a task that Tarrow (2005) has taken up.

The theoretical task for studies of collective action then is to articulate better the structured and contingent relations among international processes, states, nongovernmental organizations, and actors. In doing so, they will have to take particular care to pay attention to temporality and mechanisms—to *demonstrate* causality rather than to impute it and to explain *which* identities become salient and why. Globalization arguments alone cannot explain this important diversity in timing, location, and identity. While apparently omnipresent, globalization is not omnicausal.

Notes

1. In many ways, the themes addressed in this conference echoed the kinds of themes debated at subsequent World Social Forum meetings in Brazil, India, and Venezuela.

2. This section parallels Yashar (2002).

3. For reviews of globalization, see Held (1998); Tarrow (1998, chap. 11, 1999, 2005).

4. Here I introduce (briefly though the case may be) a set of related but different globalization arguments to tease out if and how they might help to explain the emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America. I do not introduce arguments about parallel demonstration across borders or international borrowing. Nor do I discuss the role of modularity, as movements adopt and adapt things from others. Anderson (1991), Tarrow (1998), and others have insightfully highlighted how repertoires of contention move within and across borders. This is for several reasons. First, while repertoires cross borders, they are crossing state boundaries rather than borrowing from a global set of norms, institutions, and or practices. In this sense, there is a fluidity of borders but not globalization per se. Moreover, it is hard to argue that this form of cross-border sharing is a new phenomenon; we have seen the ways in which political frames travel with the revolutions of 1848 and the student protests of 1968. In short, this pattern is not globalization but "cross-bordering/crossing of borders." Finally, these arguments do not explain the *emergence* of movements, even if they are helpful in describing the strategies that are adopted.

5. The economic globalization literature is vast and growing and has focused on several important issues—including trade, capital flows, labor markets, and investment climates. I discuss this literature only insofar as it introduces arguments that address and/or have implications for the question of collective action.

6. Sassen (1996).

7. Loker (1999).

8. See Rodrik (1997, 1998) and Garrett (1998).

9. Moody (1997, 55).

10. Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).

11. For arguments that neoliberalism (economic globalization) is largely responsible for a new growth in civil society, see Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar (1998, 21-23); and Yúdice (1998).

12. In a partial twist of this story, we find coca growers in Bolivia effectively protesting the uneven practice of globalization. While the Bolivian state has tried to privatize state industries and open up the economy to the international market, they have regulated the production of coca—working with the U.S. government to eradicate the crop. Coca growers, both Quechua and Aymara, have protested the state's violent efforts to do so—particularly given the economic profits to be had on the international market.

13. See Rodrik (1997), Adelman (1998), Wade (1996), and Weiss (1997, 1998).

14. Harvey (1996, 1998).

15. Labor protest has varied considerably across the region, a variation that is explained by factors other than (or in addition to) globalization. See Murillo (2001).

16. I do not mean to suggest here that material/socioeconomic conditions are unimportant or that these are postmaterial movements. Clearly, indigenous peoples in the Americas are largely impoverished. One of their fundamental demands is for land. However, I am suggesting that we cannot identify and explain these movements as a whole as primarily a class issue. Certainly we cannot explain why they identify in many cases primarily as Indians rather than as peasants in response to such material changes—for after all, this is what distinguishes these movements from prior modes of rural organizing. The movements discussed here do not label themselves as "peasant-based movements" but as "indigenous movements"—some of which are peasant based, other which are not. While struggling for land is a central demand, they privilege their ethnic identity and make claims to the land that stem from their rights and beliefs as Indians.

17. Falk (1993), Melucci (1998), and Wapner (1995).

18. Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b, 217-18), Brysk (1994, 1996, 2000), Fox and Brown (1998); Edelman (1988).

19. Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 213).

20. Brysk (1994, 1996, 2000).

21. See Warren (1998) and Brysk (1994, 1996). Warren, for example, highlighted how Guatemalan Pan-Mayan activists have appealed (ambivalently at times) to the international arena and international agencies to promote their cause. "In sum, Pan-Mayanists have internationalized and hybridized Mayan culture to intensify and re-politicize the cultural differences between indigenous and Ladino communities at home" (p. 179).

22. Chase Smith (1984).

23. Network-based arguments, in general, cannot yet answer some of these criticisms that I have leveled against the global networks arguments—in particular the conditions under which networks enable versus divide communities. For this reason, network arguments cannot explain movement formation in isolation from other factors.

24. Soysal (1994), Finnemore (1996), and Aziz (1999). Aziz presented an alternative perspective on the hegemony of human rights discourse as part of the process of globalization from above (by Western countries or global financial institutions) or from below (by social movements).

25. The International Labor Organization's (ILO's) Convention 169 outlines the rights of indigenous peoples and the responsibilities of multiethnic states toward them. To date, the following Latin American states have ratified ILO 169: Mexico (1990), Bolivia (1991), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1993), Peru (1994), Paraguay (1993), Honduras (1995), Guatemala (1996), Ecuador (1998), Argentina (2000), Brazil (2002), and Venezuela (2002). Most of these Latin American states have yet to live up to the terms of the Convention. Mexico (1992) and Bolivia (1994), however, passed constitutional amendments that recognize the multiethnic and pluricultural makeup of each country. A 1999 referendum on this issue took place in Guatemala and was rejected by the population; turnout, however, ran at almost 18.4 percent of registered voters. *CNN Interactive*, May 17, 1999; and *Prensa Libre*, May 17, 1999.

26. Keck (1995), Keck and Sikkink (1998a), and Brysk (2000).

27. Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 210-11) raised a similar objection to world polity theorists. It is important to note that Soysal argued that national *institutional* contexts are different and differentially filter and institutionalize international norms. However, she did not seem to question that those norms will be implemented in some fashion.

28. It is debatable whether the end of the cold war can be called a form of globalization politics or a change in global politics. I tend to think that it is the second. Huntington (1993), whose work is primarily

discussed here, did not label his argument as a globalization argument. However, his argument rested on the idea that global changes have precipitated a set of global responses that manifest themselves as the clash of civilizations. For this reason, and given the impact of this argument on policy makers, it seems necessary to at least mention it and discuss it, however briefly.

29. Fukuyama (1992).

30. Huntington (1993, 29).

31. Huntington's thesis has been duly criticized in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* and elsewhere for its imperialist and orientalist assumptions. I do not rehearse these critiques here—first, because they have already been stated and, second, because my intention is not to argue for or against the internal logic/coherence of these positions but to see what purchase they do and do not have for explaining Latin America's diverse but growing indigenous movements.

32. Yashar (1997). Statement draws on fieldwork conducted in Guatemala (March 1989 to February 1990, December 1992, and February 1996) and in Peru (August 1997). Also see Stern (1998).

33. For examples, see Canel (1992) and Cardoso (1992).

34. See Tilly (1984); Bright and Harding (1978/1984), Tarrow (1996, 1998), Foweraker (1995), Nagel (1986), and Brass (1985).

35. Tarrow (1998, 1999, 2005).

36. The breakdown of states in Africa and the countries of the former Soviet Union are notable exceptions—although the weakness of their states has little to do with globalization.

37. See Van Cott (2003, 2005), Rice and Van Cott (2006), and Madrid (2005a, 2005b).

38. I borrow the phrase "citizenship regime" from Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips (1996). They used the term to refer to the varying bundles of rights and responsibilities that citizenship can confer. I use the term in a more expansive sense to refer to (1) who has citizenship, (2) what are the terms of interest intermediation (i.e., corporatist versus pluralist), and (3) what bundle of rights are extended (i.e., T. H. Marshall's [1963] trilogy of civil, political and/or social). Corporatist citizenship regimes advanced corporatist modes of interest intermediation and social and civil rights (only sometimes also extending political ones); in practice corporatist citizenship regimes nominally granted indigenous people some civil rights (previously denied them through debt peonage); some collective land that was inalienable and indivisible (hence sustaining the land base for sustaining existing indigenous *communities*), and the promise of some social services to sustain their communities. Corporatist citizenship regimes therefore eased ethnic cleavages by promising both indigenous incorporation and unwittingly granting indigenous autonomy. As corporatist citizenship regimes eroded, however, the informal basis of indigenous local autonomy was challenged as well. And once neoliberal citizenship regimes started dismantling social rights (including the property regimes that had secured the geographic space within which indigenous communities had survived), the integrity and stability of indigenous communities was effectively threatened. Under these circumstances, I argue, ethnic cleavages were politicized in much of contemporary Latin America. In the Amazon, we see a modified version of this process, in large part because Latin American states have always been weak in this region and citizenship regimes have therefore been less visible; however, in a parallel process, ethnic cleavages in the Amazon were politicized where the state promoted corporatist and neoliberal development policies (colonization and land development) that threatened indigenous autonomy.

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