

The Necessities of Violence

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The paper notes an increasing concern with organisational violence, but also that much of the work considers violence to be a problem requiring functionally effective solutions. We argue for a more radical view of violence, which sees it as inherent to all manner of organising processes, including writing, editing and publishing. The paper considers violence in the establishment and maintenance of order, as constituted in acts of organising, inherent to Self-Other relationships, in the politics and dynamics of difference, and in issues of identity formation.

Key words: Violence; Subjectivity and identity; Knowledge-power relations; Exclusion; Differentiation; Transgression

ETYMOLOGICAL PRELUDE

It will become apparent from this, and from the other papers in this special issue, that violence has been interpreted and defined in a broad manner. It is clearly not confined to the first definition offered by the Oxford English Dictionary (2003): “The exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or property”. However, that first definition does go on to also include treatment or usage tending to “forcibly interfere with personal freedom”. On that meaning it could be argued that the editorial process has interfered with the personal freedom of those submitting authors who received a rejection. Etymologically “violence” comes from the Latin *violentia* meaning vehemence and impetuosity and is assumed to be closely related to *violare* or violate which has meaning associations with outrage, dishonour and even irreverence (On-line Etymology Dictionary, 2003). The OED (2003) also defines violence in terms of an outrage, but also as a constraint or compulsion and talks of an “undue constraint to some natural process, habit, etc., so as to prevent its free development or exercise”—a meaning clearly resonant with the effect on those banished from inclusion here. It is apparent from these definitions that violence and the violent has not and need not be confined to the exercise of physical force and direct harm. It can also be interpreted as a constraint or a limitation. Particularly in relation to violation, it also has meanings associated with irreverence and dishonour—implying that violence is concerned with some kind of breach of moral expectations or norms of appropriateness. Indeed, there are etymological intimations of transgression. The OED again relates “violation” to impurity, defilement, infringement, irreverence, desecration and profanity. It is a meaning space that connotes the transgression of norms and expectations, of sacred laws even. More prosaically, the OED also has a definition of “violate” that states: “To treat

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without proper respect or regard". Such a meaning space justifies the broad interpretation of violence adopted in this paper and in others in this issue, and justifies the characterization of the editorial process as a violent process.

THE VIOLENCE OF WRITING, EDITORIALISING AND PUBLISHING

We want to acknowledge up-front the violence inherent in the process that has led to the appearance of this special issue of the journal and the violence it continues to signify. In saying this we are referring particularly to the violence ineluctably linked to the editorial process. We also, though, wish to note the violence intrinsic to all processes associated with publishing and text production, and indeed to any process of writing. Let us deal with the more specific case of editorializing first.

As editors we have participated in power relations with respect to others. We have engaged in a process that has worked an inclusive–exclusive practice—allowing some papers/authors to appear here and others not. In doing so we have invoked aspects of academic discourse which includes the practices of peer review and editorial decision making, and also the values or rhetoric of scholarly evaluation, critique, objectivity, and an odd form of transparency. This discourse provides a rationale that enables us to provide a critique of others work and to issue a rejection. Authors in receipt of such a rejection are, at a minimum, having their interests thwarted and damaged by the reviewers and the editors, but it could be worse, the process could be delivering an abject blow to their self esteem and sense of self worth, or worse. The editing process has also excluded them from participation in at least this small arena of academic enterprise. In this case it is an irretrievable banishment.

Extending the argument a little further, we noted above that violence is inherent to all instances of the production of a text. It is violent in two ways. Firstly, as with editorializing, it works an inclusive–exclusive practice through which some discourses, meanings, discourses and parties are banished and not permitted to enter into the textual space. More importantly perhaps, a textual production is also a knowledge production and as such participates in the knowledge–power nexus. Any text is an appropriation of a knowledge space, one that it seeks to occupy and to lay claim to as a legitimate, authoritative and definitive covering. In the process of so appropriating, the text also, inevitably demarks the space that rules out other textual and knowledge possibilities, as illegitimate, non-authoritative and inappropriate. These others are banished as being beyond the pale—marginalized as mad, bad or non-sensical. Textual strategies are thus the violence done to the possibilities of meaning, they are a violent inscription, a carving out of a space amongst the infinite array of possibilities—fixing one meaning, and excluding others. This is a violation, it is a violation of the virgin, immanent meanings circulating in the space of potentiality and which are rendered ineligible by a textual practice that inscribes and privileges the particular meaning relation chosen.

Continuing our opening theme we encounter the violence inherent to the material production of a text. This has to do with the politics of publication and the institutional framing of knowledge production and dissemination in society. We, with the privilege of residing in academia, have access to the technologies of knowledge production and to the institutional and commercial machineries of publication (even though, as noted, the power and politics of that can engender violence even for those so privileged). We tend to take this for granted and neglect to notice the violence inherent to the processes and practices that have come to delineate knowledge in particular ways. By this we mean the workings of the knowledge/power praxis that instantiates certain modes of knowing and the knowledge it generates as “knowledge” whilst simultaneously denigrating other modes of knowing and

knowledge as somehow deficient, false, less than. Harding (1998) has explored and documented this process with some precision with reference to the western discourse on “science” and its capacity, from the 16th century onwards, to carve out for itself a dominating position as “the” knowledge system and as “the” system that delivers the truth. All other knowledge systems in confrontation with the knowledge system of science are cast as inferior—as mere belief systems or worse. The articulation of this process of knowledge/power with the project of colonial expansion has also been documented by Harding (1996, 1998) and others (Kumar, 1991; Nandy, 1990; Sardar, 1988).

There is violence here in the repression and denigration of others knowledge and ways of knowing. This knowledge–power nexus has become institutionally manifest in the machineries by which “western” scientific knowledge is defined, disciplined, produced, reproduced and protected. Implicate in this are the institutions of academia that police the boundaries of the scientific discourse through the practices of employment in academia, the various standards and evaluations that are applied, but particularly by the mechanisms of publishing that are responsible for the material production and reproduction of this form of knowledge. The publishing process is carefully and meticulously policed and there are very clear and trenchant processes of inclusion and exclusion therein. The production of this special issue participates in that violence.

TOWARDS A RADICAL VIEW OF ORGANISATIONAL VIOLENCE

Interest in violence in organizations has grown significantly in recent times. Much of this is in response to the panic in the US related to alarming rates of violence, and particularly following a spate of widely publicized homicides within work contexts. The age-adjusted homicide rate in the US is 6.2 per 100,000 for 2000 (Mercy *et al.*, 2003) and almost 1,000 workers are murdered every year (McDonald, 2001). However, figures do show that around 75% of workplace homicides are related to robberies or other crimes committed by outsiders (Barrier, 1995). Violence against workers is a global phenomenon with 18,000 assaulted workers each week in the US (Ginn & Henry, 2002: 4), and 1.2 million incidences of violence at work in England and Wales in 1997 (O’Connor, 2000). Such data have precipitated a response in the US particularly, where they have led to a rational economic calculus in terms of costs to business and/or the state. These costs are calculated in terms of lost productivity, absenteeism, turnover, lowered morale, litigation and other legal costs, down-time costs, wastage costs (Fenton, 1990; Ginn & Henry, 2002; Johnson, Lewis and Gardner, 1995). This type of analysis has, unsurprisingly, led to preoccupations with remedies and the literature is replete with functionalist accounts of how to “manage” organizational violence (Baron and Neuman, 1998; Chappell and Di Martino, 2000; Howard, 2001; VandenBos and Bulatao, 1996; Neuman and Baron, 1998; Waters, Lynn and Morgan, 2002).

This literature and the practices it aligns with, prescribes and supports can be seen as the orthodoxy concerning violence and organizations. It has a managerialist animus and is informed by a legalistic concern for the protection of rights and property that sometimes clothes itself in a humanitarian rhetoric. This is not to suggest that the orthodoxy has constructed a consensus when it comes to theories and explanations of violence. Indeed, even within the orthodoxy they range from the neo-Darwinian to the wholly sociological and pass through the psychoanalytic (*e.g.* Diamond, 1997) and social learning theory (O’Leary-Kelly, Griffin and Glew, 1996) *en route*. Nor is it that the orthodoxy completely dominates and that other stances have no voice. Diamond (1997) himself, for example, traces the roots of organizational violence to the toxicity of organizational cultures and the shame and injustice inherent to organizational practices and work roles. In similar vein, Williams (1994) has also

argued that organizational violence is in part precipitated by the strategies, policies, procedures, and processes that organizations routinely deploy. Others have attempted to relate organization violence to the gendered nature of organizations and its practices, and particularly to the production and re-production of masculinities (Hearn, 1994; Hearn and Collinson, 1996; Hearn and Parkin, 2001; Linstead, 1997). Some elements of Hearn's arguments are reprised in his paper in this special issue.

A still more radical view of violence and organization is to conceive of violence as either an effect of organizing, or as inherent to organising processes. The latter is certainly the perspective taken by Pelzer and Westwood in this special issue. Beginning with a meditation on Katharina Fritsch's sculpture "Tischgesellschaft", which is so suggestive of the compulsions of conformity and order, Pelzer goes on to examine how violence is integral to processes of ordering. Indeed, he argues that the very processes of civilization are ultimately about the imposition of order on disorder, and here of course he echoes Cooper's (1990) deconstruction of organization through the reversal of disorganization. Again one is reminded too of the violence of colonization as European expansion deployed the justificatory rhetoric of civilizing the Other.

We should not be seduced into imagining that the ordering effects of civilizing processes are able to eradicate violence, violence is needed not just to carve out order but also to sustain it. Pelzer rightly points to the violence that persists in altered forms within the civilized system and within legal rational states and their organizational equivalents—bureaucracies. He refers to Foucault's analysis of power, surveillance and discipline in relation to the latter, but it is to Sofsky (1996) that he turns for the dark conundrum that violence creates chaos—and hence the need for a civilizing, ordering impulse—but that order creates violence. Violence is required to separate order from disorder and the decidable from the undecidable, and to sustain order.

There is clearly a Derridean echo here, an unacknowledged reference to Derrida's critique of the pervasive tendency in western philosophy to not just seek the reassurance of some centre or *logos* but to persistently and perniciously construct and valorize a hierarchical ordering that immediately involves subordination and violence (Derrida, 1978). It also reflects the related tendency of western thought, which is to reduce the Other to the Same, to deny difference or to relocate difference in sameness—a process that again is dependent on violence (McKenna, 1992). Levinas (1969) in a sense goes further, seeing that impulse as an imperialistic one—an impulse to conquer, control and colonise the Other so that the Other is subsumed and appropriated by Self. It is precisely this violent, dynamic process of appropriation and control that Said (1978) explored in the material and discursive practices of orientalism and that the postcolonialists have pursued with vigor since. Others have come to see the tendency as underpinning the whole rationalist project—wherein the will to knowledge is fundamentally about the appropriation, comprehension, control, mastery, repression and/or subjugation of all that presents itself or is represented as "Other". The enlightenment, or for Sofsky the civilizing impetus, is a violent suppression and containment of otherness and difference.

Derrida frequently examines the dynamics of exclusion and the subjugation or marginalisation of the Other. He does so by exposing the violent imposition of hierarchisations and boundaries instantiated in language that masquerade as natural and as "given". Whilst language is the site of his critique, it is clear that the effects of this violence are not confined to language—language is never *just language* in any case. In his dismantling of *apartheid*, for example, Derrida (1985: 292) argues that there is no racism without a language, but continues: "The point is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word. Even though . . . it uses naturalist and sometimes creationist discourse—racism always betrays the perversion of a man, the 'talking

animal'. It institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it outlines in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates". In addition, he notes the stark materiality of the violence of apartheid saying that it is "an evil that cannot be summed up in a principal and abstract iniquity of a system. It is also daily suffering, oppression, poverty, violence inflicted by an arrogant white minority . . . on a mass of the black population" (Derrida, 1985: 293). We need to remember, however, that Derrida is not offering us absolute liberation, it is not that all boundaries and hierarchies can be dissolved, rather that they are all open to interrogation. What he does say is that "the best liberation from violence is a certain putting into question, which makes the search for an *arche tremble*" (Derrida, 1978:138).

While Sofsky traps us into an irredeemable cycle of violence/order–order/violence, Derrida, at least at times, seems to offer some prospect of ameliorating the effects of violence, but in the end Derrida, and Habermas too, envision violence as ineradicable. René Girard would certainly concur with this and indeed sees conflict and violence as a primary driver in all relationships. In this issue Desmond and Kavanagh examine Girard's hypothesis and relate it to organizations, indeed to the constitution of hierarchy and organisation. Once again, as with Derrida and Levinas, there is a concern with the violence inherent in the dynamic interplay between sameness and difference, and once again the Other is central to the explication (see McKenna, 1992).

For Girard desire is not characterized by a simple linear relationship between a desiring subject and an object of desire, desire is mediated through a third element, the model, or the Other, who already has the object that the subject desires. The subject begins in a relationship with a model and seeks to mimic that model. This develops into a desire for the objects (broadly conceived) that the model possesses. The subject wants to possess the objects too, to become like the model, indeed to appropriate the model so that there is no difference between them. Girard reasons that such a relationship is doomed to escalate into rivalry and conflict. It is not only that the subject covets and seeks to appropriate what the model has, but also that the model recognizes that the desire of the subject represents the dissolution of the distance between them and thus, the annihilation of the model. In a more abstract sense the dynamic pushes towards a violent implosion of the different into an intolerable sameness, which is actually an arid place of dissatisfaction and nihilism for either party. All models, all leaders in fact, are caught in this dynamic. It is one which risks persistent escalations into violence.

As Desmond and Kavanagh explain, one way of escaping this spiral into chaos is via the "cleansing" mechanism of the scapegoat, of which, for Girard, Christ is the exemplary form. The function of the scapegoat is to provide a unity in relation to this Other (the scapegoat) thereby warding off the slide into the chaos of indifferenciation. For Girard it is not difference *per se* that is threatening, since difference has organizing power, it is the boundarylessness of indifferenciation that is troublesome. Violence, then is central to Girard since it is the origin of unity and order, it is the principal of difference, the foundation of community and society. Alternatively, looked at from another perspective, "violence is an object of representation. Violence is what representation takes as its object, and what representation does to violence is to re-present it in the form of different ideas. Most obvious are the social ideas that exist to repress, to reorient, and to contain the nature of violence: these are evident in political orders, religious systems, and aesthetic forms" (Siebers, 1995).

There are persistent and deliberate ambiguities in Girard. One is that the victim is positioned as both a threat to the community that must be scapegoated, and as the "sacred" source of (originary) unity for the community. Myths and rituals are established to both mask this originary violence, but also to reference and then contain it through its mythical representation. Yet again, we do not escape violence. Violence is involved in the original

scapegoating, but continues to be present in the rituals of violence that mythologise the original violence, in an attempt to keep it at bay. Another complexity is that the relationships subject–model–object are densely interrelated in contradictory ways. Indeed, Girard says that the mimetic triangle is an isosceles one in which the subject and the model can by turns occupy the mediating role—and Girard is alert to the Sado-Masochistic potential in this relationship. The paradoxes and ambiguities are multiple. Thus for example, the model, as the Other, becomes a rival for the subject because he/she is a model, but it is because he/she is a rival that he/she has value as a model. The model/rival exists simultaneously—loved and hated at once. Similarly, the subject desires the object, but only because it represents a lack in the subject. The subject desires to appropriate the model, but if he/she does so, what is left is an arid emptiness, and the subject is driven to locate a new mimetic desire, and so on. Furthermore, mimetic desire is essentially destabilizing since it works to erode and dispel difference, precipitating us into a debilitating formlessness. In simple and personal terms, if the subject becomes the model and the model the subject, there is nothing left to differentiate them—what are they? They are nameless.

THE PRODUCTIVITY OF VIOLENCE

Neither Levinas, nor Derrida or Girard employs a simplistic view of violence as emanating from mere asymmetrical power structures or relations. This is not to say that power relations are not evident in their analysis. One theorist who does consider the power–violence relationship more frontally, but still in an unusual and nuanced way, is Pierre Clastres—a confederate of Deleuze and Guattari. Like Girard, Clastres (1994) uses anthropological analysis to explore the nature of violence, but he comes to a very different view. His analysis suggests that violence can function to limit the societies ordering effects and to limit the concentration of power. This rather counter-intuitive thesis is based on an analysis of South American indigenous cultures. He argues that by practicing systematic inter-tribal violence, these tribes resist the ordering effects that might bring into being a state or something akin to a state. Additional analysis dispels the myth of the despotic and omniscient tribal chief. The reality is that power within tribes is also dispersed and migratory, chiefs have in fact limited powers based more on a kind of temporary and restricted stewardship than a sovereign right. This, Clastres argues, is deliberate and helps to prevent the emergence of concentrations of power. The two points are of course related since if power were allowed to centralize and concentrate in a tribal head, such a person may then begin to have the means to impose further ordering mechanisms that would be centripetal in nature and the existing liberal dispersion would coalesce into a larger more ordered form. Clastres rather celebrates the dispersed and centrifugal nature of this system. It is a thesis that is the obverse of what was argued earlier in this paper: that order is an inscription of violence, a carving out of the chaos of the dispersed and the unformed. For Clastres the opposite is true, violence sustains dispersal and prevents the emergence of an overly ordered system. There are suggestions in the analysis that the tribal violence is seen as necessary in order to avoid the greater violence of that radical centripetal, de-differentiating impetus by which peoples are aggregated, ordered and homogenised into a state.

Other writers have tried to point to the productivity of violence. For some there is the productive potential of violence that transgresses, violence that subverts the norms and seeks to break free from the shackles of convention and the orthodoxy. This would be apparent, for example, in the (sexual) violence of De Sade and the erotics of Bataille (see Bataille, 1977, 1985). De Sade (1990) argues that to escape the existential angst of our mundane lives we need to break the shackles of the conventional discourses that bind us and eviscerate the links

to family, society and god. His is a deliberate politics of emancipation through transgression—sometimes violently achieved. De Sade is deeply critical of humans' attempts to eradicate or sublimate their violent, cruel, animal nature. There is a resonance in this to Foucault's search for the limit moment and the freedom that transgression offers, both in his texts and in his personal life (see Miller, 1994). For these writers violence is productive in that it challenges the taboos and conventions that bind and limit us and opens up new potentialities of agency and being.

That violence can be conceived of as necessary for any movement beyond the confines of the known and orthodox and for creative impulses and outcomes has been acknowledged by a number of writers. Recently, for example Whiteson (2000) has discussed this "terrible beauty"—the violence that provides the productivity to transcend and create in our lives and in society. He documents the various ways in which the violent provides this necessary force of production and creativity—whilst accepting the destructive aspects of violence too. We have allowed ourselves, he argues, to construct awkward double binds with respect to violence, making it at once a pathology, a threat and an aberration, whilst at the same time making it something by which we are fascinated and compelled. This results in twin movements by which we elevate it and make a fetish of it, whilst also seeking to repress and eliminate it. The latter tendency has tended to mean that we have an impoverished or distorted understanding of violence, which actually severely limits any goals we might entertain of elimination of control in any case. We need, Whiteson argues, to accept and embrace violence as a natural phenomenon and learn to exploit its creative potential.

The connection between violence and creativity also has roots in the psychoanalytic tradition. For example, Freud discusses how in the act of creating something the artist or producer violently reconfigures material into a new form. But further, the transformation into the new may also be seen as violence in the sense that it may constitute a transgression. At yet another level the creative impulse draws upon repressed and libidinal roots and so the creative act is the release and realization of repressed violent impulses (*e.g.* Diamond, 1996; McDougall, 1999). In various ways then, violence can be seen as not only inherent to processes of organizing and ordering, but also productive and creative, providing the means by which the new becomes a possibility and the prisons of convention and orthodoxy challenged.

VIOLENCE, SUBJECTIVITY AND IDENTITY

The above discussion has tended to look at violence from a somewhat abstract, systemic and collectivised level. However, violence is nothing if not pervasive—in all spheres of human activity and interaction—and multifaceted. Violence, whether systemic and rooted in discourses and practices, is experienced and enacted very much at the individual level. Indeed, as already intimated, it is not only interpersonal and personal, but also intrapersonal. As Das *et al.* (2001) note, violence is best not considered as a series of discrete events but as embedded in the very processes of ordering that instantiate societies and cultures (and, we might add, organisations), indeed such violence is not just embedded in such processes, the processes *are* forms of violence. Conceived thus violence is multiple but also mundane, and the more elemental for this and for its hidden or disguised quality. In these violent processes, identities are formed and deformed, subjectivities realized and rendered, and possibilities for agency circumscribed.

It could be suggested that all of the papers in this special issue deal with the relationship between violence self and identity to some extent, but it is most apparent in the papers by Westwood, by Hearn and by Cusack, Kavanagh and Jack. Indeed, a remarkable feature of the

contributions to the SCOS conference in Dublin¹ that was the initial impetus for this special issue was the testimony that many of the papers presented bore to the personal experience of academics in academe or to other highly personalized accounts of violence. In fact, the genesis of the theme for that conference lay in one of the editors' personal experiences of violence. Early in Bergin's teaching career, he was the "victim" of bullying—by a "functional psychopath", as he was described by a colleague, who has since continued to climb the rungs of the organizational ladder aided by the helping hands of normal male aggressor-colleagues. Westwood's paper in this collection also recounts a story of abuse and debasement in an academic setting amongst his set of autobiographical vignettes of institutional violence. But it is Hearn who minutely dissects the operation of organizational violence and its effects in academia with his, also autobiographical, account of a Professorial appointment process in Finland.

Hearn's paper lays out the serial, apparently routine and multiple acts of violence against an individual that an institution can manufacture. It is the very routineness, almost taken-for-granted way in which the institution engages in lies and deceptions, partialities, self-serving and discrimination that provides Hearn's paper with its power. He is also able to suggest that this normalizing of violence and mistreatment may have much to do with the gendered nature of organizations and their management and leadership—a thesis he has explored more fully elsewhere (Hearn, 1994; Hearn and Parkin, 2001). The gendered nature of violence and the association of violence with masculinity has been a common theme in the literature of late (Felson, 2002; Gilbert and Eby, 2003; Hearn *et al.*, 1996).

Both Westwood and Hearn describe acts of institutional violence in academic settings and speculate on its effect on their own sense of self and identity, but do not fully explore that. Westwood talks of how violence marks the body and leaves its scars, but also notes the marking of the person, identity and personality. It is quite apparent that violence can be such that it forms, deforms and reforms the person, their personality and their sense of self and identity. This and related issues have been explored in some of the classic work on violence and aggression in psychology (Lorenz, 1966; Rivera and Switzer, 1976; Toch, 1969) including the work on authority, obedience and conformity (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1969). They are explored more recently in multiple sites of violence by Das *et al.* (2000)—and not just via the trauma of the extremes of violence, but in the more subtle and mundane acts of violence contained in everyday life and in the enactments of the state and science. The papers provide accounts of how identities are not just shaped through victimhood—although they can be—but also through participation in, and being witness too, violence. Indeed, like Whiteson (2000), but in a different mode, Das and colleagues see violence as so pervasive in contemporary cultures that all of our identities are to some degree shaped by it.

Some people's identity is shaped by their engagement with groups, part of whose *raison d'être* is some form of violent creed of engagement. Westwood, for example draws our attention to the football violence and the sense of identity derived from belonging to some supporters group and those groups' involvement in violence. The pervasiveness of violence in our societies and the various ways in which people deal with that and make adjustments to sense of self is also documented in Besteman (2002) and in Rapp-Paglicci, Roberts, and Wodarski (2002).

An indication of the devastating effect of violence on self and identity can be located in the colonial experience as depicted in the work of Fanon. Westwood (this issue) notes Fanon's treatment of the Master-Slave relationship and the asymmetries of violence inherent to that. But he does not pursue Fanon's (1967) heart-rending account of identity violations and the defamation of self in *Black Skin, White Masks*. The violence of colonialism is not just the invasion, conquering and control of the colonised, it is also about the traps of identity that

the colonial experience constructs. The colonised gets into a debilitating double-bind wherein he/she comes to perceive the white skin—and this is meant both literally and metaphorically as all that the white coloniser represents and displays to the colonised—as an object of desire. The colonised wants to become like the white coloniser and starts to adopt the ways of the coloniser resulting in processes of hybridization. The colonised is then trapped: there is a mimicry, but one that will always be known and remain as such—and the coloniser will offer reminders. It is apparent that there has been an attempted appropriation of the white mask, but it remains just a mask, since there is the ever present and inescapable facticity of the black skin. The coloniser colludes with this process, signaling the wish to bring the colonised in, to approach the white mask (since the colonised is more controllable if close and incorporated), but always ultimately rejecting, never really accepting the colonised and always keeping them on the outside as Other (since penetration by the Other would dissolve the boundary between Self and Other and thus erase the power distance on which the coloniser rests and depends). There is a desperate and brutal violence here that radically wrenches and destabilizes the identity of the colonised.

Westwood's account is also rather bleak. He talks of economies of violence in which violence is exchanged, transacted and circulated. For him, violence is pervasive to all social systems and indeed, inherent to all processes of ordering and organising. In the economies of violence there is no prospect of eradicating or ending violence, although it does move and shift as discourses of justification and legitimation alter. The transactions of violence occur at all levels, within the individual, between individuals, across groups, within organisations and institutions and across societies and cultures. Westwood uses his autobiographical stories in a productive relationship with existing theories and explanations of violence: on the one hand exploring such theories and explanations to see what light they throw on his experience, and on the other exploring how his stories resonate with and even illuminate the theories and explanations.

The discourses that Westwood sees as shaping and delineating economies of violence also construct the boundaries that define and circumscribe violence, the violent and the victims of violence. Such discourses, as Westwood makes clear, identify the nature, quantity and quality of violence that is deemed legitimate and permissible in specifiable social locations. They also articulate and specify modes of reciprocation and how those who deviate from the rules and norms are to be treated and the violence that might be visited upon them. An important bounding effect of such discourses is the identification and definition of those who are deemed to be in some manner outside the norm, deviant, odd, non-normal. It is part of the inevitable inclusion–exclusion practice of discourse and an inevitable aspect of the power–knowledge nexus in which that which is not included as knowledge and as legitimately covered by the discourse is banished, marginalised, effaced, repressed or in other ways excluded. This is the process of discursive boundary establishment and therefore of center–periphery relationships and marginalisation. It is these processes and effects that Foucault's analysis has so stunningly revealed: the power–knowledge processes and practices that have in various ways defined the mad, the ill, the sexually deviant, the criminal (Foucault 1965, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1978). These are violent processes of the interpolation of one order of things, one knowledge, and the simultaneous exclusion and degradation of alternatives. It is also clear that identities and subject positions are also constructed in these processes and that some identities and subject positions are constructed in impoverished locations and positions—marginalized and degraded, punished and even incarcerated.

We are all positioned by these discourses in varying ways and degrees. They provide the subject positions within which we act and the positions of intelligibility and spaces of articulation by which we can comprehend and speak, participate in the discourses and effect a degree of agency. All subject positions are circumscribed and bounded—limited by the

possibilities that the particular discourses that shape them permit. However, some people will find themselves in marginal positions in relation to the consequential discourses of their social systems or in relatively delegitimated or weak subject positions. It is part of the violence of discourse, and indeed language, that such exclusionary practices are enacted. Part of this process is the construction of deviance and of the stigmatisation of those who are not deemed to be properly, fully or effectively incorporated into the dominant discourses and the proper subject positions they offer.

The paper by Cusack *et al.* in this issue deals with the stigmatisation of a particular group of people who are somewhat marginalised. This group is the popular culture fan, and more specifically in this case, the Star Trek fan or “Trekkie”. In a sense the paper deals with the marks of violence since “stigma” refers to:

1. a mark of disgrace or infamy; a stain or reproach, as on one’s reputation
2. a characteristic mark or sign of defect, degeneration, etc.

(Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, 1989)

Stigma serves to exclude, to position people on the outside, in the margin, beyond the pale. It generates a set of attitudes or stereotypes by which the stigmatised can be labelled, identified and discriminated against. Of note is the fact that the word “stigma” derives from “stigmata”, which, in Christian theology at least, refers to the marks of the cross that Christ bore. What is significant here is that those marks of Christ were not the stigma signifying his sins, but the sins of the world, of those who needed a scapegoat. Thus we have an echo of Girard and his analysis of violence here. It is also worth noting that this process of blaming others for one’s own errors, faults or “sins” would be referred to as projection and thus signals the intra-psychic and interpersonal circulation of violence in an economy of which Westwood speaks.

People are stigmatised then, either because they are seen to transgress the norms of the dominant groupings in society, or because they are the victims of some collective projection. In the case of the Cusack *et al.* paper the transgressions are transgressions of the norms associated with contemporary consumptive behaviour. Specifically they are deemed to have transgressed norms relating to both the object and the manner of their consumptive practices. Using the ideas of Bourdieu (1984), the authors suggest that “Trekkies” exhibit bad taste and furthermore, pursue the object of their bad taste in an unseemly, not to say fanatical manner. Their interest and mode of engagement with this incidental product of popular culture is seen to be improper and somewhat deviant.

Clearly the stigma attached to this group of people is relatively minor and in some respects less consequential than the stigma attached to, say, HIV/AIDS sufferers (Busza, 2001; Campbell, 1999) or people with very particular sexual proclivities (Evans, 1993; Hudson, Laws and Ward, 2002; Wilson, 1987), sex workers (Brewis and Linstead, 2000) or the mentally ill (Read and Baker, 1996). Nonetheless, it does allow Cusack *et al.* (in this issue) to explore the processes of stigmatisation. They particularly focus on the manner in which the “Trekkies” cope with being stigmatized. Two mechanisms feature in the analysis: the use of self-surveillance and the use of humour.

The violence of stigmatisation is interesting since it has a double-loop. There is the violence by which the stigma is created and applied in the first place, but there is also the violence by which those so stigmatised continue to be treated. The first is the violence of exclusion and marginalisation, the second the violence of ongoing discrimination and exclusion. For the HIV/AIDS victim for example, in some countries the ongoing discrimination can mean ostracism from many arenas of normal social interaction, but it can also mean exclusion from work and from those very services that the sufferer needs and would benefit from—including those within the systems health system itself (Campbell,

1999). Stigmatisation is a powerful mechanism for social control, it identifies, delineates and marginalises those deemed to have transgressed or to be outside the norms and values of the powerful majority.

CONCLUSION

This paper has discussed various aspects of violence and related them to organizations. It has sought to go beyond the more orthodox treatments of the topic which tend to be managerialist and to contain prescriptions based on a rational-economic calculation of the costs of violence. This paper has pursued a more radical trajectory. It has seen violence as inherent to the very processes of organizing and ordering. Thus organizations are effects of violence and at the same time create conditions for the further enactment of violence. The paper has also related violence to some important issues with respect to subjectivity, self and identity. Violence is so pervasive that it would be nonsensical to suggest that these matters of self and identity somehow go untouched by its effects. We have argued that self and identity are shaped, deformed and reconstituted by violence in complex ways.

In pursuing these arguments we have, at the same time, linked them to and introduced the other papers in this special issue. Each of these other papers attends to the themes discussed here and are engaged in the process of unmasking organizations to reveal them as theatres of violence and violations. Each alerts us to different aspects of the operation of violence and its effects and collectively they greatly enrich our understanding of this rather neglected topic in organization studies.

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